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Politics of Inclusion. Which Conception of  
Citizenship for Animals? 
Sandra Seubert ∗ 
Abstract: »Politik der Inklusion. Welche Konzeption von Bürgerschaft für Tiere?«. 
The text discusses Donaldson and Kymlicka's approach to citizenship claims for 
animals in the context of competing conceptions of citizenship in current politi-
cal theory. It outlines the normative dynamic of inclusion that modern concep-
tions of citizenship have stimulated and analyses possible tensions for a republi-
can approach to citizenship. These tensions increase, it is argued, when the 
republican conception of citizenship (which Kymlicka developed in his earlier 
writings) is shifted towards a more communitarian one in the context of animal 
rights. 
Keywords: Citizenship, Zoopolis, human-animal relations, animal rights, liberal 
republicanism, inclusion, political participation. 
1.  Introduction 
Many of the central and most enduring struggles in the history of politics have 
taken place in the “language of citizenship” (Tully 2014, 3). This also holds 
true today: There is an ongoing interest in changing concepts and practices of 
citizenship. Public and academic discourses in political theory, philosophy and 
sociology have been challenging traditional, status- and state-oriented under-
standings of citizenship and pushing towards a search for new forms of mem-
bership. Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s elaboration of a political theory 
of animal rights is connected to these discourses. They deliberately understand 
their book Zoopolis as a contribution to citizenship theory (Donaldson and 
Kymlicka 2011, especially ch. 3). Donaldson and Kymlicka invite us on a “jour-
ney,” a journey to a territory we do not know: to enlarge our thinking about ani-
mals, how we interpret our relations with them, and to envisage an idea of com-
mon membership.  
What political implications are there if we approach animal rights from the 
perspective of citizenship theory? Which (if any) conception of citizenship for 
animals is plausible and worth defending? My reflections will proceed in three 
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steps: firstly outlining challenges to current citizenship theory; secondly sur-
veying Donaldson and Kymlicka’s approach along some analytical distinctions; 
and thirdly critically evaluating their proposal for animals as co-citizens. 
2.  Challenges of Current Citizenship Theory 
2.1  Conceptions of Citizenship  
Mapping the theoretical landscape of citizenship theory, two different positions 
about conceptions of citizenship appear. The first position states that citizen-
ship is to be constructed as a bounded concept. That means that citizenship 
always refers to a membership status, membership in a group. What is indis-
pensable then is a “we-perspective” for social as well as political integration, 
and equally unavoidable are procedures of inclusion and exclusion to distin-
guish one group from another (see Habermas 1992). There are differences 
about whether this “we-perspective” is supposed to be a precondition for or 
rather a result of political participation. But within this “camp,” it is generally 
agreed that some kind of “imagined community,” historically the concept of 
nation, plays a key role in successfully generating such a “we-perspective.” If 
the “we-perspective” of a particular bounded community is challenged or is 
diffusing, it is necessary to reach out for a substitute.  
The second position focuses on the universal aspect of citizenship. In prin-
ciple, according to the statement, citizenship ultimately is to be conceived of as 
unbounded. It is always in struggle, a constantly unfinished process of over-
coming exclusions, including ever more categories of persons and even non-
persons. From this perspective the concept of modern democracy is linked to 
the idea that a person as such, and not as a member of a pre-existing group (not 
even the group of human beings), can claim rights. The nation state used to 
monopolize the protection of these rights, but this is no longer the case. Politi-
cal rights are certainly the core of citizenship rights but the institutionalization 
of these rights has created and always creates anew unjustified boundaries.1 
This perspective brings forward an interpretation of democracy that revolves 
around the idea of individual rights and is no longer in need of presupposing a 
strong community – some argue not even in need of the idea of a demos any-
more. It is only the claim for an equality of rights that breaks up the communi-
tarian logic inherent in every appeal to a sovereign ‘people’ as a collectivity 
                                                             
1  Such boundaries find an expression in the construction of “otherness”: differences like 
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full citizenship status (Nussbaum 2006, 14-22; Balibar 2004, 68). For justifying external ex-
clusion the category of “the foreigner” plays a similar role (Honig 2003). 
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(Colliot-Thélène 2011, 195-6). The ultimate claim that moves the dynamic 
towards inclusion is the “right to have rights” (Arendt 1951, 177). 
2.2  Two Conflicting Dynamics 
Perspectives on citizenship as unbounded are prominent in the debates on 
transformations of citizenship. They are frequently criticized from a neo-
republican perspective: Enlarging rights, argues e.g. Richard Bellamy, does not 
tell us anything about the constitution of citizenship.2 There are mediating 
positions between these two poles “bounded/unbounded” that claim a tension, a 
“paradox” (Benhabib 2006, 33) between the exclusionary/inclusionary dimen-
sions of citizenship, or even an antinomy deep at the heart of the concept of 
citizenship that cannot be resolved (Balibar 2014). 
Apart from these positions, two conflicting dynamics prove to be important 
for reflections on modern citizenship: a deepening dynamic on the one hand, 
and a broadening on the other (Seubert 2014). The political idea of citizenship 
put developmental pressure towards overcoming unjustified forms of exclu-
sion. The pressure towards inclusion evolved within the frame of existing polit-
ical communities, deepening our understanding of what it means to interact as 
equals. At the same time the idea of citizenship had a universalistic appeal, 
broadening the scope of inclusion, challenging existing understandings of 
membership and justifications of closure.  
3.  Locating Kymlicka’s (Human-)Citizenship and 
Donaldson and Kymlicka’s Animal-as-Citizen Approach 
Kymlicka is among those political theorists who have contributed extensively 
to the re-actualisation of citizenship theory since the 1990s (see Kymlicka and 
Norman 1994; Kymlicka 1995, 2007). Two analytical distinctions might help 
to locate his theoretical endeavour and the shift towards animal rights with Sue 
Donaldson. 
3.1  Liberal/Republican 
One well-known analytical distinction to characterize different approaches to 
political theory is the liberal/republican distinction. It is related to different 
models of citizenship: a “citizenship as rights” model (which is supposed to be 
liberal), a “citizenship as participation” model (which is supposed to be repub-
lican) or a “citizenship as belonging” model (which refers to a more communi-
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tarian variant). Where are Will Kymlicka’s human-citizenship and Donaldson 
and Kymlicka’s animals-as-citizen approaches to be located? 
No doubt, conceptually rights play an important role – in the context of a 
“liberal multiculturalism” as well as in the context of a political theory of ani-
mal rights: Citizenship is about rights and claiming rights. Kymlicka is – and 
after turning to animal rights with Sue Donaldson continues to be – a major 
advocate of differentiated citizenship: group-specific rights or policies that are 
able to recognize distinctive identities. They are in favour of a “politics of 
diversity”: Citizens should not be conceived of as abstract equals but as situat-
ed and embedded individuals who are nevertheless supposed to negotiate their 
common good on an equitable basis. Thus, rights are not narrowly conceived of 
as negative rights. Citizenship is supposed to be centred on political rights and 
political participation. At least Kymlicka’s (previous) approach can be charac-
terized as (liberal)-republican, related to a “citizenship as (equal) participation 
model.” For the animal-as-citizen approach the question arises whether animal 
rights are just another form of a “politics of diversity” that can be included in 
this model. 
3.2  Statist/Cosmopolitan 
With regard to the second distinction, a statist perspective would stress that the 
modern idea of citizenship is bound up in a package of other concepts such as 
state sovereignty, territorial nation state and democratic legitimacy. Kymlicka 
has so far conceived of citizenship as a bounded concept: human beings are 
members of distinct self-governing societies on particular territories, i.e. states.3 
Although mobility creates multiple overlapping qualified and mediated forms 
of citizenship, a group-differentiated account needs to distinguish between in-
group and out-group, co-citizens and foreigners. Cosmopolitanism tends to 
deny that these distinctions are legitimate. From this perspective tensions be-
tween deepening and broadening dynamics make citizenship an inherently 
“problematic concept” (Linklater 2007, 67).4 Kymlicka takes – and Donaldson 
and Kymlicka continue to take – a critical stance towards cosmopolitanism. For 
them universalising the category of citizenship would mean abolishing it.5 The 
major argument is that political membership generates positive duties and 
relational obligations. We are involved in different, special relationships with 
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4  Martha Nussbaum argues that the division of the human (and non-human) species into 
different political communities and (sovereign) states restricts our moral and political obli-
gations in an arbitrary way (Nussbaum 2002, 3-17). 
5  Donaldson and Kymlicka write: “Whether we universalize the category of citizenship or 
abolish it, the result would be the same – everyone would have an equal right to get on the 
plane” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 52-3). 
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other human beings. They create different bonds of interdependence and duties 
of care and the same holds true for non-human animals. The highest degree of 
interdependence is with domesticated animals, the lowest with wild animals, 
and “liminal” animals are in between. 
4.  Animals as Co-Citizens? 
Obviously there are many continuities in the human-citizen and the animal-as-
citizen approaches that Kymlicka develops with Sue Donaldson. But several 
questions suggest themselves: Is claiming citizenship rights for “non-human 
animals” just another step in this unfinished process of overcoming exclusions? 
If the animal-as-citizen approach is based on a bounded conception what would 
be the “we-perspective” of a human-animal society? How are the conflicting 
dynamics (deepening/broadening) mediated in the animal-as-citizen approach? 
Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka shift the animal-rights approach from le-
gal to political theory because they intend to understand the human-animal 
relationship in a more political way. They criticize the relative ineffectiveness 
of a purely rights-based approach. Liberalism in their view is not only a theory 
of universal (human) rights. It is about a complex integration of universal hu-
man rights and bounded, group-differentiated rights of political and cultural 
membership. Political communities as nation states form an “ethical communi-
ty,” human beings develop deep attachments to particular communities, territo-
ries and individuals and they have a right to govern themselves in ways that 
reflect their language and history. These assumptions already raise difficult 
questions in the human case and they are not likely to become easier when 
transferred to animals. How are humans and animals supposed to interact polit-
ically? What politics of inclusion would be appropriate in the case of animals? 
I will concentrate on the strongest claim of the animal-as-citizen approach: 
the relationship with those animals that Donaldson and Kymlicka take to be 
“members of our society,” “co-members of a shared human-animal political (!) 
community,” i.e. co-citizens (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 74). Because 
humans have brought these animals into their society they have, according to 
Donaldson and Kymlicka, a right of residency, a right to have their interest 
counted when determining the public good, a right to shape evolving rules of 
interaction, and to be represented through forms of “dependent agency.” 
4.1  Sharing a Political Community of Equals?  
What would it mean to share a society or even a political community with ani-
mals? Sharing a ‘world’ (Arendt) that is constituted through communicative 
interaction between humans seems to be different. The human-animal distinction 
still plays a role with regard to rational reflection, which makes a difference for 
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the practice of norm-compliance, cooperation and the expression of a subjec-
tive good. Even conceptualising the human-animal relation along the model of 
SID-peoples’ claims for recognition and inclusion is not convincing. 
If the core of citizenship as a political concept is direct or indirect participa-
tion in the process of authorising the law, deliberation on equal terms, opinion- 
and will-formation play an important role. Voting rights guarantee “final con-
trol over the agenda” (Dahl) and express a political principle of equality: the 
recognition of an equivalent status independent of particular social standing 
and an inclusion in a collective event which generates social practices and 
bonds of community. How can animals meet this presupposition and interact 
with humans on an equitable basis? Neglecting the limits of human-animal 
interaction risks downplaying the demands of democratic citizenship. 
4.2  A (Non-)Deliberative Understanding of the Common Good? 
Democratic political agency, according to Donaldson and Kymlicka, is a neces-
sary but not sufficient function of citizenship. They invite us to enlarge our 
understanding of verbal communication and refer to the concept of “dependent 
agency” for describing how political inclusion of animals might be possible. 
“Collaborators” help to construct a “script,” relying on embodied rather than 
verbal communication, on trust rather than voice.  
But it is an important insight of liberal-republican thinking that interests are 
not pre-political but need to be developed and interpreted in a deliberative 
process. Shifting the interpretation of interests away from their actual and com-
prehensible articulation has a paternalistic potential. It seems that the animal-
as-citizen approach overestimates the potentials of human-animal communica-
tion and underestimates abuse of power and asymmetries. Humans can (and 
should) take (what they interpret as) animals’ interests into account but they 
cannot deliberate about interest with animals on an equitable basis. Again, this 
might weaken the concept of democratic citizenship for which overcoming a 
kind of second-class citizenship (for those categories of persons whose interests 
should be represented but who were not supposed to speak for themselves) was 
and still is of utmost importance.  
5.  Conclusion  
The shift from a human-citizen to the animal-as-citizen approach goes along 
with a shift towards a more communitarian citizenship-as-belonging model. 
The conception of citizenship thereby moves in a non-deliberative direction, 
which is in tension with the participatory demands of the liberal-republican 
model. Even more, democratic citizenship is thinned down when it neglects 
fundamental differences in interaction, cooperation and reasoning between 
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humans and animals. This would particularly devalue the social practice of 
voting as the political core of citizenship. 
While broadening our understanding of human-animal-relationships is in-
deed important and normatively desirable, treating animals as political equals 
seems misplaced. It tends to blur meaningful differences and strangeness be-
tween animals and humans. Conceptually there is enough room for a political 
theory of animal rights without framing it in the “language of citizenship.” 
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